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the debt without first resorting to the security or the grantee. But
that is true in any surety contract. It in no way affects the creditor's
duty to retain the security for the mortgagor. If the surety pays he
has a right under the doctrine of.subrogation to have the debt and
the security assigned to him.' 0 If the security has been released the
assignment can only operate as an assignment of an unsecured debt
leaving the mortgagor dependent upon the general assets of the
grantee on an equal basis with other creditors. Such a result is
inconsistent with the mortgagor's contract and would, in a great
many cases, result in a total loss of the debt.
The result of the decision might be justified in fairness on the
ground that the mortgagor was not prejudiced. For the unreleased
portion of the land was sufficient to satisfy the obligation. It would
seem, however, that the rule announced would render the sale of an
equity of redemption extremely hazardous to the mortgagor and thus
menace this type of security transaction.

Winston-Salem, N. C.

DALLACE MCLENNAN.

Negligence-Statutory Measure of Damages For
Wrongful Death.
A twelve-year-old boy who contributed to his mother's support
by carrying papers was killed by what was at most ordinary negligence on the part of the defendant. In an action by the mother,
held, under the wrongful death statute of Georgia, the plaintiff may
recover the full value of the life of the child upon whom she was
dependent, or who contributed to her support.'
The Georgia statute provides for a recovery for the death of a
husband, wife, or parent in any event, and for the death of a child
if at least partial dependency is shown, 2 where the death is caused
"0In In re Roth, supra note 5, at 520, the court says: "The mortgagor, like
tny other surety called upon to make payment, is entitled to have surrendered
unimpaired all securities and remedies which the creditor holds, including in
this case both the mortgage and the personal obligation of the Lumber Company to pay the mortgagor's debt to the Supply Company." Schenectady Say.
Bank v. Ashton, 205 App. Div. 781, 200 N. Y. Supp. 245 (1923) ; Cooper v.

Jewett, 233 Fed. 618, (C. C. A. 8th, 1916); O'Neill v. Russell, 192 Wis.
141, 212 N. W. 278 (1927) ; Stevens v. First Nat. Bank, 117 Okla. 148, 245

Pac. 567 (1925).
In North Carolina it is held that where the surety pays the creditor, the security

must be assigned to a trustee or else the payment operates as a satisfaction and
in no other way can it be kept alive. Tiddy v. Harris, 101 N. C. 589, 8 S.E.

227 (1888) ; Peebles v. Gay, 115 N. C. 38, 20 S.E. 173 (1894).

' Michael v. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 165.S. E. 37 (Ga. 1932).
, See Central of Georgia. R. Co. v. Henson, 121 Ga. 462, 463, 49 S. E. 278
(1904) ("partial dependence upon the child's labor, accompanied by substantial

NOTES AND COMMENTS
by a crime or by criminal or other negligence. 3 It further provides
that the measure of damages shall be the full value of the life of the
deceased without deduction for the necessary or other personal ex4
penses of the deceased had he lived.
A recovery of the full value of the life of the deceased, irrespective of the pecuniary loss to the person entitled to recover, is a recovery of exemplary damages, and the Georgia court has specifically
recognized this fact.5 Nevertheless, such recovery has been permitted in many cases where the defendant was guilty of only ordinary
negligence.6
The general (and common law) rule of the measure of damages
is strict compensation for the pecuniary loss suffered by the plaintiff,7 with exemplary damages permitted only where the defendant

was guilty of at least gross negligence in the sense of culpable indifference to consequences." It is a well established rule of the common law that ordinary negligence is not enough to justify the infliction of exemplary damages. 9 The Georgia provision is clearly contrary to this established common law rule and no similar provision
has been found in the wrongful death statutes of any other state.
At common law no right of action survived to any person for a
wrongful death.10 The right originated with Lord Campbell's Act,"
contribution therefrom to the maintenance of the plaintiff, is sufficient") ; Fuller
v. Inman, 10 Ga. App. 680, 684, 74 S. E. 287, 291 (1912) ("If he performs
substantial services of which she receives the benefit in and about the household, this is a contribution to her support, and she is dependent upon that
child, within meaning of the law, without reference to whether he contributes
one penny to her support").
8

GA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) §4424.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1930) §4425.

'GA.
5

See Georgia Railroad and Banking Co. v. Spinks, 111 Ga. 571, 36 S. E.
855 (1900); Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Swann, 19 Ga. App. 691, 91 S. E.
1068, 1069 (1917). ("The statute with which we are dealing, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed. The act is partly punitive
and partly compensatory"); Michael v. Western and Atlantic R. Co., supra
note8 1.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. McDonald, 135 Ga. 635, 70 S. E. 249
(1910); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Young, 40 Ga. App. 4, 148 S. E. 757
(1929); Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Gray, 172 Ga. 286, 157 S. E. 48?
(1931).
7 1 SEDGwICK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920) §30.
'Reed v. Keith, 99 Wis. 672, 75 N. W. 392 (1898) ; Cotton v. Fisheries
Products Co., 181 N. C. 151, 106 S. E. 487 (1921) ; 1 SEDGWICK, op. cit. supra
note 7, §363.
' Denver and R. G. R. Co. v. Roller, 100 Fed. 738, 49 L. R. A. 77 (C. C. A.
9th, 1900); Coley v. North Carolina R. Co., 129 N. C. 407, 40 S. E. 195,
57 L. R. A. 817 (1901); 1 SEaowicK,.loc cit. supra note 8.

20The Mobile Life Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S. 754, 24 L. ed. 580
(1878); 2 SFmGwcK, op. cit. supra note 7, §570.
219 & 10 VicT.,

c. 93

(1842).
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and similar statutes have been enacted in almost every jurisdiction of
the United States.' 2 Several of the states have provided for this
right in their constitutions.' 3 These statutes are all similar in substance with some differences as respects: (1) the party in whose
name the action is to be brought ;14 (2) the distribution of the sum
recovered;15 and (3) the limit of the sum recoverable."o
As to provisions for the measure of damages, these statutes may
be divided into four classes:
(1) Those in which the recovery is based strictly on compensation.' 7 No exemplary damages are permitted however culpable
the act.' 8 This type of provision is found in more than half of the
states. It seems to be the better rule in that the plaintiff is fully
recompensed, in so far as money can compensate for the loss, and
the defendant is not subject to double punishment by way of exemplary damages and a possible criminal action.
(2) Those in which the recbvery is based on compensation plus
such exemplary damages as the degree of culpability merits. In
some statutes, such exemplary damages are specifically provided
A careful search of the statute books showed that such a provision has
been enacted in every state except Louisiana. However, Lduisiana permits

an action for a wrongful death. Aymond v. Western Union Tel. Co., 151
La. 184, 91 So. 671 (1922).
For example, N. Y. Const., Art. 1, §18: "The right of action now existing
to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated;
and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation".
I Most of the statutes require the action to be brought by the personal representative for the benefit of the designated beneficiaries. For example, VA.
CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1930) §5787. A few require the action to be brought
by the real party in interest. For example, GA. CODE ANN (Michie, 1926)
§4424.
" In every jurisdiction except Oregon it is provided that the damages recovered are free from the debts and liabilities of the deceased, and certain
persons are designated as the beneficiaries. For example, N. C. CoDE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §160. The Oregon statute, however, provides that "the amount
recovered, if any, shall be administered as other personal property of the
deceased person." Oma. CODE ANN. (1930) §5-703.
"The great majority of the statutes have not provided a limit to the sum
recoverable, and some states have provided in their constitutions that no such
limit may be established. For example, N. Y. Const., supra note 13. Other
statutes limit the amount that may be recovered to a specified sum, in most
cases $10,000. For example, KAN. Rxv. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 60, §3203.
2 For example, MicH. Comp.LAWS (1929) §14062, "... and in every action
the jury may give such damages as they shall deem fair and just, with reference to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death, to those persons who
may be entitled to such damages when recovered." N. C. CoDE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §161.
I Western Union Tel Co. v. Catlett, 177 Fed. 71 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910); see
Bradley v. Ohio River & C. R. Co., 122 N. C. 972, 975, 30 S. E. 8 (1898).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
for,19 while in others the result is attained by judicial decision under
a clause in the wrongful death statute which provides for just damages without limiting to pecuniary loss. 20 This type of provision is
found in about twenty states. It is most analogous to the aforementioned common law rule of damages, but is open to the objection that
it gives the plaintiff more than he has lost, and subjects the defendant to the possibility of double punishment.
(3) Those statutes in which the recovery is based solely on the
degree of culpability. This provision is found only in Massachu22
setts, 2 1 by a specific clause, and in Alabama by judicial decision.
This rule is most fair to the defendant, as he pays according to the
degree of his wrong. It is, however, furthest from the original object of damages, i. e., compensation.
(4) Those in which the recovery is given for the full value of the
life. The Georgia statute stands alone in this class.2 3 This provision
is similar to those of the first class in that the measure of damages
is the same regardless of the degree of culpability. The first class
denies exemplary damages even where death was the result of a
wilful assault ;24 the fourth class gives exemplary damages even
where the death resulted from ordinary negligence alone. 25
Despite the great differences in the statutory provisions and the
variations from the common law rule of damages, these statutes have
been uniformly held valid. 28 Apparently there is nothing.to prevent
the legislature from providing for any measure of damages it may
deem desirable, and the court, in the instant case, is correct in its conclusion that it is clearly within the power of the legislature to permit
recovery of exemplary damages for homicide resulting from ordinary

" For example,

TEX. Rr v. CIV.

CODE

(Vernon, 1925) art. 4673: "When the

death is caused by the wilful act or omission, or gross negligence of the defendant, exemplary as well as actual damages may be recovered."
Matthews v. Warner's Adm'r., 29 Gratt. 570, 26 Am. Rep. 396 (Va. 1877).
SMAss. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 229, §5: "...
damages to be assessed with
reference to the degree of his culpability."
'Dowling v. Garner, 195 Ala. 493, 10 So. 150 (1915); Alabama Power
Co. v. Talmadge, 207 Ala. 86, 93 So. 548 (1921).

" Supra notes 3 & 4.
" Supra note 17.
Supra note 6.
3 U. S. Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Co. v. .Sullivan; 3 F. (2d) 794 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1925); Alabama Power Co. v. Talmadge, 207 Ala. 86, 93 So. 549
(1921); Shaffer v. Chicago, R. 1. & P. P. Co., 300 Mo. 477, 254 S.W. 257
(1923) ; aff'd 263 U. S. 687, 44 S. Ct. 228, 68 L. ed. 507 (1924) ; Hull v.
Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 76 S. C. 278, 57 S. E. 28, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1213
(1907); Michael v. Western & Atl. R. Co., 165 S. E. 37 (Ga. 1932).
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negligence, as well as for homicide resulting from wanton, wilful or
27
criminal negligence.

IRviN

E. ERB.

Public Utilities--When a Utility May Withhold or Withdraw
Service For Reasons of Credit.
Where, upon the payment of the usual fee, a telephone company
refused to furnish its service without an additional deposit, on the
ground that plaintiff was admittedly a bad credit risk, held, the company must serve the plaintiff without the additional security on the
same terms as it serves other subscribers.'
It is almost universally conceded that a public utility may withdraw and withhold its service for nonpayment of a recent and just
bill, since collection by legal process is practically prohibitive. And
this is so even though the consumer has some counterclaim against
the company. 2 But although the bill be legitimate, where the sum is
owed by a public agency, the corporation may not use the summary
method employed in collecting its debts from delinquent individuals,
since here mandamus will lie to compel the proper official to pay the
bill.$ Another instance where. the courts will enjoin a public utility
from withholding service for nonpayment of a recent bill is where the
4
refusal to pay is on the ground that its service has been inadequate.
And where the bill is bona fide in dispute, the company may not refuse to serve the consumer until such bill is paid.3 The courts are
very reluctant to permit the corporation to be its own judge and jury
' Micba~l v. Western & Atlantic R. Co., 165 S. E. 37, 43 (Ga. 1932).
'Horton v. Interstate Tel. & Tel. Co., 202 N. C. 610, 163 S. E. 694 (1932).
The court explains its decision on the ground that the rule requiring an additional deposit by bad. risks had never been approved by the Corporation Commission. It takes no definite stand, but intimates in a nebulous manner, that
in the absence of such fact, it might have reached a contrary result.
'Barrett v. Broad River Power Co., 146 S. C. 85, 143 S. E. 650 (1928);
Central La. Power Co. v. Thomas, 145 Miss. 352, 110 So. 673 (1927) ; Buffalo
County Tel. Co. v. Turner, 82 Neb. 841, 118 N. W. 1064 (1908); Irvin v.
Rushville Co-operative Tel. Co., 161 Ind. 524, 69 N. E. 258 (1903).
' Board of Education v. Richmond, 137 N. Y. Supp. 62 (1912) (water supply
in a school) ; People ex rel. Johnson v. Barrows, 124 N. Y. Supp. 270 (1910)
(water supply of public park).
'Mays v. Hutchinson, P. U. R. 1931B 104 (Pa. 1930); Case v. Meadow
Lawn Tel. Co., P. U. R. 1929A 421 (Minn. 1928); State ex rel. Payne v.
Kuloch Tel. Co., 93 Mo. App. 349, 67 S. W. 684 (1902) ; McEntee v. Kingston
Water Co., 165 N. Y. 27, 58 N. E. 785 (1900).
'O'Neal v. Citizen's Pub. Service Co., 157 S. C. 320, 154 S. E. 217 (1930);
Ala. Water Service Co. v. Harris, 221 Ala. 516, 129 So. 5 (1930); Dodd v.
City of Atlanta, 154 Ga. 33, 113 S. E. 166 (1922) ; Poole v. Paris Mt. Water
Co., 81 S. C. 438, 62 S. E. 874 (1908).

